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UNITED STATES V. BOOKER: THE PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE
IN PLAIN ERROR REVIEW
DEBORAH S. NALL*
INTRODUCTION
United States v. Booker created a sea change in the law by rendering
the federal sentencing guidelines ("Guidelines") advisory rather than man-
datory. 2 Criminal defendants sentenced prior to the decision-under what
were then perceived as mandatory sentencing formulae-may therefore
raise the issue of Booker error 3 on appeal as long as they had appeals pend-
ing when the decision was issued.4 Such appeals will be reviewed for
"plain error," the traditional standard for issues that were neither raised at
trial nor expressly waived.
Plain error review occurs when a defendant did not raise an issue at
trial, but the federal court of appeals determines there is (1) error;5 (2) that
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2006; B.A., English
Literature, DePaul University, 1999. 1 am particularly grateful to Professor Michael A. Scodro and
Andrew Merrick for their thoughtful comments and insight, and to Luke Shannon for his careful edit-
ing. I also owe thanks to Professor Kathryn Penrose, Mark DeBofsky, Fred Daley, Barbara Long, John
and Daryl Nall, and Paul Olson. Each summer, the Law Review invites students to participate in a
closed-research writing competition, then selects new members based on writing ability. The Chicago-
Kent Law Review selected this Comment as the Best Case Comment from the 2005 Summer Candidacy
Competition.
1. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
2. See id. at 756; see also United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 750 (10th Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (Briscoe, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3. The sentencing judge may have committed either a constitutional error, by enhancing the
defendant's sentence pursuant to facts found by the judge, or a non-constitutional (statutory or proce-
dural) error, by sentencing a defendant under guidelines presumed to be mandatory rather than advi-
sory. See Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731. All twelve circuits agree that constitutional and statutory
error both individually constitute error that is plain for the purpose of plain error review. See, e.g., id. at
732.
4. All of the federal appellate courts to consider the issue have determined that the Court's
decision in Booker is not retroactive. See United States v. Gentry, No. 04-11221, 2005 WL 3317891, at
*6 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 2005) ("[W]e join the several courts of appeals that have held that Booker does not
apply retroactively.").
5. The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that "[d]eviation from a legal rule is
,error' unless the rule has been waived." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1993).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
is plain;6 (3) that "affects substantial rights;" and (4) that "seriously af-
fect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."'7
Although it is clear that federal appellate courts are to use the plain error
standard when Booker error is raised for the first time on direct appeal,8 the
Supreme Court of the United States offers no guidance in Booker for the
proper interpretation of the third plain error prong, when the error preju-
dices a defendant's substantial rights. This omission has created an intercir-
cuit split over the correct application of the substantial rights prong of plain
error review in cases involving Booker error.9
In an unusual two-part opinion, the Court held in Booker that the pro-
vision that renders the Guidelines mandatory for federal judges is unconsti-
tutional because it violates the Sixth Amendment. 10 Striking the mandatory
provision, the Court reaffirmed its prior holding in Apprendi v. New Jer-
sey 1 that the Sixth Amendment requires any fact other than a prior convic-
tion that is necessary to support a more lengthy sentence than that
authorized by the facts established by a guilty plea or a jury verdict to be
"admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
6. "[W]here the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of
appeal[,] it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Johnson v. United
States, 520 U.S. 461,468 (1997).
7. Id. at 466-67 (quoting Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1996)).
8. Because it would have been impossible for defendants to raise the issue at trial, all twelve
federal appellate courts agree that plain error analysis is appropriate. See United States v. Booker, 125
S. Ct. 738, 769 (2005). If the court of appeals determines that the plain error affected the defendant's
substantial rights to a degree that the outcome of the trial was affected, the court may either reverse or
vacate the sentence. Thomas M. Hoskinson, Note, Criminal Procedure: Trial Integrity and the Defen-
dant's Rights Under the Plain Error Rule 52(b), 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1129, 1131-32 (2004).
9. All circuits except the Tenth have determined that a defendant who is able to demonstrate
prejudice under the third prong will therefore be able to demonstrate that the error seriously impaired
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding as required by the plain error test.
See United States v. Heldeman, 402 F.3d 220, 223-24 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Crosby, 397
F.3d 103, 118 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 555 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 275 (5th Cir.
2005); United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 530 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d
471,483 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 553-54 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 406 F.3d 1261, 1262 (1 1th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Tenth Circuit, however,
uses a different analysis according to whether the sentencing judge committed constitutional or statu-
tory Booker error. If the error was constitutional, the court will require a lesser showing from the defen-
dant, but if the error was statutory, the Tenth Circuit will not "notice [the] error unless [it] is
'particularly egregious' and failure to notice the error would result in a 'miscarriage of justice."' United
States v. Clifton, 406 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403
F.3d 727, 735) (emphasis in original).
10. The Court excised two sections of the statute: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), the provision of the Act
that makes the Guidelines mandatory; and § 3742(e), the provision that provides standards of review for
appeal. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764.
11. 530U.S.466(2000).
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doubt."'12 A different majority of the Court left intact most of the remaining
provisions of the Guidelines, 13 stating that without the provision making it
mandatory, "the statute falls outside the scope of Apprendi's require-
ment." 14 The Booker decision thus attempts to sustain Congress's sentenc-
ing reform objective while at the same time protecting defendants'
constitutional right to a jury trial.
Although the Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to a trial
by jury, ' 5 the Constitution does not elaborate upon what this right entails. 16
The Court, however, has interpreted the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial as "no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of
power in our constitutional structure... meant to ensure [the people's]
control in the judiciary."' 7 Accordingly, it is not surprising that the criminal
defendant's right to a jury trial has clashed with attempts to standardize
sentencing. 18 This clash between institutional reform and individual rights
came to a head in Booker.
The Booker Court carefully noted that "[t]he ball now lies in Con-
gress' court" 19 to enact legislation that does not violate the Constitution,
but any legislative action will make no difference to those defendants sen-
tenced prior to Booker and currently awaiting appeal. It is therefore neces-
sary that the Court clarify Booker's effect on the substantial rights prong of
the plain error rule, not only for those defendants, but also for future defen-
dants whose claims are unrelated to Booker but whose substantial rights
have similarly been affected in such a way that requires a presumption of
prejudice to ensure that all defendants receive procedural due process. 20
12. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
13. The Court stated that even without the mandatory provision, judges must consider "the Guide-
lines together with other sentencing goals." Id. at 764. Accordingly, the Guidelines as they now exist
are to be used by judges in an advisory fashion, as one among many factors to consider in sentencing.
Id.
14. Id.
15. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a... trial, by an impartial
jury...."U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. R. Craig Green, Apprendi's Limits, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 1155, 1155 (2005).
17. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-06 (2004).
18. Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U.
L. REv. 693, 711 (2005).
19. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768.
20. As one commentator has noted, a guilt-based approach to appellate review of error, either for
harmless error or plain error, has a
tendency to undermine our most important legal principles.... Our system of justice stands
above others only because it recognizes a sphere of personal liberty into which the govern-
ment cannot intrude. Marking the boundary of this sphere are the individual rights guaranteed
by our Constitution, and, to a lesser extent, by our laws. These rights, however, do not remain
vital merely because they are enshrined in our most revered documents. They remain vital
only if an active and alert federal judiciary stands ready to enforce them, even when their en-
forcement yields unpalatable results.
2006]
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Part I of this Comment traces the developments leading up to the
Court's decision in Booker; Part II examines the development of the sub-
stantial rights prong of plain error review. Part III discusses the circuit split
created by the Court's decision in Booker, compares the approaches to
substantial rights analysis taken by three of the federal appellate courts that
have considered appeals of pre-Booker sentences, 21 and argues that the
circuit split created by the Court's decision in Booker requires the Court to
decide whether cases involving Booker error present an example of plain
error that should be presumed prejudicial.22 This Comment ultimately con-
cludes that the Court should follow the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit,
because this is the only approach that both considers the Booker opinion in
its entirety and correctly analyzes the Court's plain error jurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND
Until Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, federal
judges exercised enormous discretion in criminal sentencing.23 In 1987,
however, the Guidelines transformed the judge into an administrative fact-
finder. Demoted from their traditional role, judges were now reduced to
plugging facts into a formula created by the Commissioners to determine
appropriate sentences. 24 In contrast to early colonial times in America and
in England, where it was up to the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt
all elements necessary to a particular determinate sentence, the Guidelines
required only that the judge find facts necessary for sentence enhancement
by a preponderance of the evidence. 25 The Guidelines were intended to
Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Toler-
ated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1167, 1194-95 (1995).
21. This Comment compares opinions from the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. A complete
survey of post-Booker opinions from all twelve circuits is beyond the scope of this Comment.
22. In United States v. Olano, the Court declined to
decide whether the phrase "affecting substantial rights" is always synonymous with "prejudi-
cial."..... There may be a special category of forfeited errors that can be corrected regardless
of their effect on the outcome, but this issue need not be addressed. Nor need we address
those errors that should be presumed prejudicial if the defendant cannot make a specific
showing of prejudice.
507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993).
23. For a more complete discussion of the history of judicial discretion in criminal sentencing, see
Klein, supra note 18, at 696-712. See also Rosemary T. Cakmis, The Role of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in the Wake of United States v. Booker and United States. v. Fanfan, 56 MERCER L. REV.
1131, 1133 (2005) (stating that, prior to enactment of the Guidelines, federal judges had discretion to
impose any sentence permissible under the statutory framework provided by the U.S. Code, from
probation to the statutory maximum).
24. Klein, supra note 18, at 693-94.
25. Id. at 700.
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increase uniformity in sentencing,26 thereby promoting a more equitable
criminal justice system, but in a series of cases that culminated in Booker,
the Court determined that the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment by
depriving the criminal defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial as to those facts used to enhance sentences.
Although the constitutionality of the Guidelines was directly (and un-
successfully) challenged on separation of powers and non-delegation
grounds in 1989, it was not until 1999, in Jones v. United States, that the
Court considered the Sixth Amendment implications of mandatory sentenc-
ing guidelines.27 The Court relied on both statutory interpretation and the
doctrine of constitutional doubt to avoid the actual constitutional issue, and
interpreted the statute under which the defendant was charged not as outlin-
ing a single crime with three separate penalties, each contingent upon fac-
tors that need not be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but
instead as three distinct offenses. 28 As such, the provisions of the statute
that set forth the maximum penalties were to be considered elements, not
sentencing factors, and thus had to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.29 The Court observed in a footnote, however, that prior cases sug-
gested that
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must
be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
3 0
The following year, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court directly ad-
dressed the issue hinted at in Jones.31 Apprendi concerned a New Jersey
criminal statute that allowed a defendant who was convicted by a jury of a
second-degree offense to be subjected to punishment identical to that for
first-degree offenses "based upon the judge's finding, [of additional facts]
by a preponderance of the evidence .... ,,32 The Court invalidated the stat-
ute on the basis that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
26. "Congress' basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the sentencing system in the
direction of increased uniformity." United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 761 (2005).
27. 526 U.S. 227, 243 (1999). Jones involved a facial challenge to the federal carjacking statute,
18 U.S.C. § 2119.
28. Id. at250-51.
29. Klein, supra note 18, at 703.
30. Jones, 526 U.S. at 235, 243 n.243. The Supreme Court carved out the recidivism exception in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States. 523 U.S. 224, 230-35 (1998).




maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. ' 33 Although Apprendi did not directly implicate the Guidelines, the
decision was a landmark in modem sentencing law in that it brought the
fate of the Guidelines into question. 34 Indeed, during oral argument, there
was concern that the "rule might be applied to state and federal determinate
sentencing guideline regimes"; 35 the four Apprendi dissenters expressed
their reservation that the Court's rule would invalidate the Guidelines 36
because "the Guidelines could survive only if the majority's logic were
limited to statutory maxima. '37
Despite the dissenters' fears, the Court did not revisit the questions
raised by Apprendi until 2004, in Blakely v. Washington.38 In Blakely, the
Court used the rule announced in Apprendi to invalidate a Washington state
law sentence 39 imposed under a sentencing scheme "remarkably similar in
content" to the Guidelines.40 The Court also explained that "the 'statutory
maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admit-
ted by the defendant."'4 1 Many believed the decision signaled the demise of
the Guidelines, causing one scholar to refer to Blakely as "the biggest
criminal justice decision not just of this past term [2003],. . . but perhaps in
the history of the Supreme Court."'42 "[T]he federal appellate courts re-
33. Id. at 490.
34. The Apprendi decision shifted authority from judge to jury, thereby affecting both federal and
state criminal law practice. Prosecutors began to plead facts in the indictment as elements, which were
then presented to a jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Klein, supra note 18, at 705-06.
35. Id. at 705.
36. As one commentator said,
Although the Apprendi majority specifically noted (as the majority did in Blakely) that the
federal sentencing guidelines were not before the Court, Justice O'Connor, in her dissent in
Apprendi, stated that the principle announced by the majority "thus would apply.., to all de-
terminate-sentencing schemes in which the length of a defendant's sentence within the statu-
tory range turns on specific factual determinations (e.g., the federal Sentencing Guidelines)."
Justice O'Connor's dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Breyer, and
Justice Kennedy, went on to chastise the Apprendi majority for failing "to clarify the precise
contours of the constitutional principle underlying its decision," which, according to the dis-
sent, left "federal and state judges.., in a state of limbo." In breaking from the "tradition-
ally.., cautious approach" of Supreme Court precedent, the dissent claimed: "The Court
throws that caution to the wind and, in the process, threatens to cast sentencing in the United
States into what will likely prove to be a lengthy period of considerable confusion."
Cakmis, supra note 23, at 1136-37. See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
37. Green, supra note 16, at 1161 (italics omitted).
38. 524 U.S. 296 (2004).
39. Id. at 301.
40. Green, supra note 16, at 1163.
41. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (emphasis in original).
42. Douglas Berman, Supreme Court Cleanup in Aisle 4: Blakely Is Too Big and Messy to Ignore,
SLATE, July 16, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2104014/.
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sponded to Blakely by producing one of the quickest, most robust circuit
conflicts on record."
43
In contrast to the four-year lag after its decision in Apprendi, the Court
acted quickly after Blakely. Two separate cases, United States v. Booker
and United States v. Fanfan, presented an opportunity for the Court to re-
solve the uncertainty. 44 The Court granted the Solicitor General's certiorari
petitions in the two cases (later consolidated into United States v. Booker)
on August 2, 2004, scheduling oral arguments for October 4, 2004.45 Ap-
proximately four months later, on January 12, 2005, the Court delivered a
two-part opinion in which it held: (1) that the mandatory aspect of the
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial;46 and (2) the
legislative intent behind the guidelines mandated a remedy of excision and
severance, thus rendering the Guidelines advisory. 47 Part one of the opin-
ion, authored by Justice Stevens, 48 discussed the Constitutional violations;
part two, written by Justice Breyer,49 discussed the remedy.
In part one, the Court reviewed the Sixth Amendment's requirement
that every criminal defendant have the right to a jury trial, including the
right that a jury, not a judge, "find [the defendant] guilty of all the elements
of the crime with which he is charged. ' '50 In Apprendi, it was a "matter of
simple justice ... that the procedural safeguards designed to protect [the
defendant] from punishment for [one crime] should apply equally to his
43. Green, supra note 16, at 1164. See also Cakmis, supra note 23, at 1145; Nancy J. King &
Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 316, 317-20 (2004) (collecting cases and
describing circuit split); infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
44. As told by Klein,
Mr. Booker was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute 92.5 grams of
crack cocaine, which led to a 210-262 month sentence under the Guidelines. At the sentenc-
ing hearing, however, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Booker
actually possessed an additional 566 grams of crack, and he therefore imposed an enhanced
360 month sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed the sentence after finding that it violated
Mr. Booker's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on the aggravating fact. The facts author-
ized by the jury verdict in Mr. Fanfan's drug trafficking case led to a seventy-eight month
sentence under the Guidelines. At sentencing, the district judge found additional facts (addi-
tional quantities of cocaine and crack and that the defendant had been a leader) authorizing a
188-235 month sentence. Like the Seventh Circuit, the trial judge found Blakely applicable to
the Guidelines and therefore sentenced Fanfan only to the lower seventy-eight months, to
avoid a Sixth Amendment violation.
Klein, supra note 18, at 712-13.
45. Cakmis, supra note 23, at 1146.
46. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 751-52.
47. Id. at 757.
48. The majority in part one was comprised of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsberg. Id. at 746.
49. The majority in part two was comprised of Justice Breyer, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsberg. Id. at 756.
50. Id. at 748, 750 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995)).
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violation of [another]."51 Accordingly, any fact other than a previous con-
viction "that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statu-
tory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. '52 Following precedent, including the reasoning of
Blakely and Apprendi, the Court determined in Booker that if the Guide-
lines were advisory rather than mandatory, their use would not implicate
the Sixth Amendment because the defendant has no right to have a jury
determine which facts a judge finds relevant when the judge is exercising
her judicial discretion.53
Judges traditionally have been given discretion to increase sentences
in accordance with blameworthiness. 54 As Justice Stevens pointed out,
however, this tradition "does not provide a sound guide to enforcement of
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in today's world. '55 With
increased pressure to be "tough on crime," legislation that regulates sen-
tencing takes power away from the jury and gives it to the judge. 56 Con-
fronted with the need to preserve the right to a jury trial in light of this new
set of circumstances, the Court came to the answer it developed in the line
of cases culminating with Booker:57
More important than the language used in our holding in Apprendi are
the principles we sought to vindicate. Those principles are unquestiona-
bly applicable to the Guidelines. They are not the product of recent inno-
vations in our jurisprudence, but rather have their genesis in the ideals
our constitutional tradition assimilated from the common law. The Fram-
ers of the Constitution understood the threat of "judicial despotism" that
could arise from "arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions"
without the benefit of a jury in criminal cases. 58
In accordance with this statement, the Court reaffirmed Apprendi59
and held that under the Guidelines, any fact necessary to sustain a sentence
beyond the maximum authorized by the defendant's guilty plea or jury
51. The Court determined in Apprendi that "the procedural safeguards designed to protect Ap-
prendi from punishment for the possession of a firearm should apply equally to his violation of the hate
crime statute." Id. at 748 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000)).
52. Id. at 746 (quoting the Seventh Circuit's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 375 F.3d 508,
510 (2004)).
53. Id. at 750 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,246 (1949)).
54. Id. at 750-51.
55. Id. at 751.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 752.
58. Id. at 753 (citation omitted).
59. In Apprendi, the Court held that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary
to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or
a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at
756.
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verdict "must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt."'60 Relying on its 1949 decision in Williams v. New
York,61 the Court stated that "everyone agrees that the constitutional issues
presented by these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had
omitted from the SRA the provisions that make the Guidelines binding on
district judges. '62 Yet, as written, the Guidelines are not advisory, "they are
mandatory and binding on all judges.
'63
In part two of Booker, the Court constructed a remedy to salvage the
Guidelines while avoiding future Sixth Amendment violations: the Court
severed and excised § 3553(b)(1), which made the Guidelines mandatory.
64
Dissenting from this second part of the opinion, Justice Stevens proposed
that a requirement for jury fact-finding be grafted onto the Guidelines in-
stead of severing and excising the two provisions.65 The majority, however,
determined that this approach was not in keeping with Congress's intent to
increase uniformity in sentencing and correlate sentencing to "real con-
duct."'66 Acknowledging that the end result was a non-mandatory sentenc-
ing scheme, the Court stated only that it is now up to Congress to devise a
standardized sentencing scheme that complies with the Constitution.
67
With regard to those defendants currently awaiting appeal, for whom
any Congressional action presumably will come too late, the Court indi-
cated in Booker that both the Sixth Amendment holding and the remedial
60. Id.
61. 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). See also Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy
and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1095 (2005). ("Williams is
frequently cited for its statement on the breadth of factfinding at sentencing available to trial courts in
indeterminate sentencing structures: 'A sentencing judge.., is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt.
His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment
after the issue of guilt has been determined."').
62. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750.
63. Id.
64. The Court also excised § 3742(e), which "sets forth standards of review on appeal," because
the provision made reference to the mandatory nature of the Guidelines. Id. at 764.
65. Justice Stevens's approach
would retain the Sentencing Act (and the Guidelines) as written, but would engraft onto the
existing system [the Court's] Sixth Amendment "jury trial" requirement. The addition would
change the Guidelines by preventing the sentencing court from increasing a sentence on the
basis of a fact that the jury did not find (or that the offender did not admit).
Id. at 757.
66. The Court cited five reasons for this conclusion: (1) the statutory language and history sup-
ports a reading that the judge, not the jury, is intended to consider "the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant"; (2) the link between sentencing and real
conduct would be weakened, thereby decreasing, rather than increasing uniformity in sentencing; (3)
the system would become overly complex, and it would be impossible to administer; (4) prosecutors
would have too much power over sentencing, further decreasing uniformity; and (5) the new system
would "make it more difficult to adjust sentences upward than to adjust them downward." Id. at 758-64
(emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 768.
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holding must be applied to all cases on direct review. 68 This does not mean
that all sentences imposed under the mandatory Guidelines will violate the
Sixth Amendment. Federal appellate courts have correctly recognized two
separate Booker errors. The sentencing judge may have committed a consti-
tutional error by enhancing the defendant's sentence pursuant to facts
found by the judge, not a jury, because the "Sixth Amendment requires
juries, not judges, to find facts relevant to sentencing. '69 The sentencing
judge may also have committed a non-constitutional (statutory or proce-
dural) error, which arises out of the second part of the Booker opinion:
even if a sentencing judge did not enhance the defendant's sentence pursu-
ant to facts found by the judge rather than the jury, the judge would err by
sentencing a defendant under guidelines presumed to be mandatory rather
than advisory. 70
In its remedial holding, the Court emphasized that all appeals should
end with a new sentencing hearing: reviewing courts are expected "to apply
ordinary prudential doctrines" such as the plain error test.71 Nonetheless,
the Court affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit, and remanded
Booker's case to the district court for resentencing.72 The Court also re-
manded respondent Fanfan's case because although his sentence does not
violate the Sixth Amendment, "the Government (and the defendant should
he so choose) may seek resentencing under the system set forth in [the
Court's] opinions. '73 The Court's remand of both cases for resentencing
provides valuable instruction to federal appellate courts about the direction
they should follow in applying the substantial rights prong of plain error
review: the sentencing judge may have committed a constitutional or a non-
constitutional error (or both), and at least some cases must be remanded for
resentencing.
74
68. Id. at 769.
69. Id. at 756.
70. See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 731-32 (10th Cir. 2005).
71. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
72. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court, holding that the lower court's
application of the Guidelines conflicted with the Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi. Id. at 746, 769.
73. Id. at 769.
74. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 552-53 (4th Cir. 2005).
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II. PLAIN ERROR REVIEW
The plain error doctrine,75 which evolved from the common law, has
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court at least since 1896.76
It was not until 1993, however, in United States v. Olano, that the Court
clarified the standard for plain error review, 77 which it refined in United
States v. Cotton:78 "before an appellate court can correct an error not raised
at trial, 79 there must be (1) 'error,' (2) that is 'plain,' . . (3) that 'affect[s]
substantial rights[,]"' and (4) that "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings. '' 80 The third prong usually
means that the error must have prejudiced the defendant by affecting the
outcome of the case during trial. 81 The burden typically is on the defendant
to show that the error was prejudicial, 82 but there are two exceptions to this
rule: structural errors and errors that are presumed to be prejudicial. 83
A. Structural Error Exception
Structural errors are mistakes that undermine "the fairness of a crimi-
nal proceeding as a whole[, such that] even preserved error requires rever-
75. The doctrine is codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which states that
"[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to
the attention of the court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
76. Jeffrey L. Lowry, Plain Error Rule-Clarifying Plain Error Analysis Under Rule 52(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065, 1065 (1994).
77. Federal appellate courts may review an error that was not noticed if the error is plain and it
affects substantial rights. "Moreover, Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the forfeited error within
the sound discretion of the court of appeals, and the court should not exercise that discretion unless the
error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."' United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
78. 535 U.S. 625, 631-32 (2002).
79. Errors that were properly raised at trial are governed by the harmless error rule. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 52(a). For a complete discussion of the rule, see Roger J. Traynor, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR
(1970); see also Edwards, supra note 20.
80. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631-32 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,466-67 (1997)).
81. Olano,507U.S. at734.
82. The substantial rights inquiry is the same under plain error or harmless error, "with one impor-
tant difference: It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with
respect to prejudice." Id. "In cases where the burden of demonstrating prejudice (or materiality) is on
the defendant seeking relief, we have invoked a standard with similarities to the Kotteakos formulation
in requiring the showing of 'a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the
proceeding would have been different."' United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-82
(2004) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). In Kotteakos v. United States, the
Court held that in cases where the reviewing judge is not certain the judgment was unaffected by the
error, there was an effect on the defendant's substantial rights. 328 U.S. 750, 763-64 (1946). See also
Edwards, supra note 20, at 1175.
83. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.
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sal without regard to the mistake's effect on the proceeding." 84 As the
Court explained in Arizona v. Fulminante, a structural error is a "structural
defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than
simply an error in the trial process itself."'85 In such cases, the error may not
be found harmless regardless of whether the defendant is able to demon-
strate prejudice sufficient to satisfy the requirement of affecting substantial
rights. The Court has found such defects in only a limited set of cases, 86
however, and seems disinclined to extend the doctrine, 87 subsequently
holding that "[i]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial
adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other constitutional er-
rors that may have occurred are [not structural errors]." 88
In certain cases, where structural errors undermine "the fairness of a
criminal proceeding as a whole," a court may reverse "without regard to the
mistake's effect on the proceeding. ' 89 In most cases, however, an error will
not be considered to affect substantial rights unless the defendant can show
that "the result of the proceeding would have been different" if the error
had not occurred.90 In United States v. Dominguez Benitez, the Court ad-
dressed the question of what showing the defendant must make to obtain
relief when the trial court fails to give a warning required by Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 1 1.91 Declining to extend the structural error exten-
sion to Dominguez Benitez, the Court held that to obtain relief, the defen-
dant "must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would
not have entered the plea."92
84. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10
(1991)).
85. 499U.S.at310.
86. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (a total deprivation of the right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, (1927) (lack
of an impartial trial judge); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (unlawful exclusion of grand jurors
of defendant's race); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (the right to self-representation at
trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (the right to a public trial); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275 (1993) (erroneous reasonable doubt instruction to jury)).
87. In Cotton, the Court did not reach the question of whether an indictment error fell within the
class of structural error because it resolved the case by determining that "the error did not seriously
affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Cotton, 535
U.S. 625, 632-33 (2002). See also Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466, 469 (The Court did not reach the question
of whether the district court's failure to submit an element of the false statement offense to the petit jury
constituted structural error.).
88. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 734 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).
89. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10).
90. Id. at 81-82 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
91. The district court failed to warn the defendant that his plea of guilty could not be withdrawn if
the court did not accept the Government's recommendations. Id. at 77.
92. Id. at 83.
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To justify this decision, the Court cited the policies behind the plain
error doctrine93 and the "particular importance of the finality of guilty
pleas,.. . [which] are indispensable in the operation of the modem criminal
justice system."' 94 Dominguez Benitez provided no reason to depart from
the general rule, however, because the claimed violation was not of due
process, but of Rule 11, a distinction, according to the Court, worthy of
repetition.95 This distinction is particularly apt in light of the fact that
Booker is the progeny of Jones and Apprendi, which involved not only the
jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, but also due process rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.96
B. Presumption of Prejudice Exception
The second category of errors that may be corrected without requiring
the defendant to show prejudice is where the defendant "cannot make a
specific showing of prejudice" and therefore the error should be "presumed
prejudicial. '97 While the Olano Court raised the possibility that such a
category might exist, it did not provide examples, stating only that there
might be some errors that should be presumed prejudicial because of the
difficulty of making a specific showing of prejudice. 98 The Court has not
considered the possibility of presumed prejudice again since Olano, but
neither has it repudiated the language. 99
Appellate review of plain errors is discretionary,lOO but federal appel-
late courts should correct plain errors that affect "substantial rights if the
error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judi-
cial proceedings."'101 In Olano, which involved a violation of Federal Rule
93. As explained by the Court, the policies underpinning Rule 52(b) are "to encourage timely
objections and reduce wasteful reversals by demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for unpreserved
error." Id. at 82.
94. Id. at 82-83.
95. Id. at 83.
96. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 (1999); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
97. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993).
98. Id.
99. See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 756 (10th Cir. 2005) (Briscoe, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that although the Court has not mentioned the category of
presumed prejudice since Olano, "it is equally true that the Supreme Court has never expressly repudi-
ated the language").
100. Plain error review allows appellate courts to correct errors not raised at trial. For a more
complete discussion, see Hoskinson, supra note 8, at 1131.
101. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (citing United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
2006]
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
of Criminal Procedure 24(c), 102 the Court determined that the ultimate in-
quiry is whether the intrusion affected the jury's deliberations and subse-
quent verdict. 103 Deciding that it did not, the Court held that the court of
appeals lacked authority to correct the error because the error did not affect
substantial rights. 104 Dissenting from the majority opinion, Justice Stevens
declared that some defects are subject to reversal even if prejudice cannot
be shown, "not only because it is so difficult to measure their effects ...
but also because such defects 'undermin[e] the structural integrity of the
criminal tribunal itself." ' 105
As properly understood, 106 Booker error, unlike the error at issue in
Dominguez Benitez, implicates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. Moreover,
Booker error involves no countervailing interest such as the finality of
guilty pleas. Accordingly, cases involving Booker error should be exempt
from the general rule requiring defendants to demonstrate prejudice in or-
der to obtain relief.
III. THE SUPREME COURT MUST PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO THE LOWER
COURTS REGARDING BooKER's EFFECT ON SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS
The disparate post-Booker opinions delivered by the federal appellate
courts are in direct opposition to Congress's intent to increase uniformity in
sentencing, which the Supreme Court sought to uphold in Booker. This lack
of congruity among the circuits demonstrates that the Supreme Court's
failure to outline the proper application of the third prong of the plain error
test must be remedied. Furthermore, the circuit split provides an opportu-
nity for the Court to clarify which errors should be presumed prejudicial
when the defendant will have great difficulty in making a specific showing
of prejudice.
The sea change created by Booker makes it "impossible to tell what
considerations counsel for both sides might have brought to the sentencing
judge's attention had they known that they could urge the judge to impose a
102. As restated by Olano, Rule 24(c) says, "An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror
shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict." Id. at 730 (citing FED. R. CRiM. PROC.
24(c)). The rule was violated by the presence of alternate jurors during deliberations. Id. at 737.
103. Id. at 739. See also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946) (stating that the
question is not whether the jury reached the correct verdict despite the error, but "rather what effect the
error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision").
104. Olano, 507 U.S. at 741.
105. Id. at 743 (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986)).
106. See discussion infra Part Il.
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non-Guidelines sentence." 107 For example, under advisory Guidelines,
defense "counsel are now able to present aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances 'that existed at the time [of pre-Booker sentencing] but were
not available for consideration under the mandatory Guidelines re-
gime.""' 108 Such an omission presents an example of a situation in which a
defendant is prejudiced, but will be unable to demonstrate that prejudice on
appeal because the record cannot reflect events that did not occur at trial.
Accordingly, the Court should address whether cases implicating Booker or
similar error, where most defendants cannot make a specific showing of
prejudice, require a presumption of prejudice to assure that those defen-
dants are not denied due process.
Each of the twelve circuits has taken a slightly different tack in deal-
ing with direct review of Booker error, but the opinions can be generally
classified into three broad categories. In the Category One, the court ap-
plies the conventional plain error doctrine expounded in United States v.
Olano.109 The First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits follow this
approach, which requires the defendant to demonstrate by a reasonable
probability that the district court would have imposed a more lenient sen-
tence under an advisory-Guidelines scheme. 110 Within this first category,
the First, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have concluded that the sentencing
judge erred only by applying the Guidelines as mandatory, 111 and thus no
error would have occurred had the Guidelines been advisory. The Tenth'
12
and Eleventh 13 Circuits recognize two separate errors, one constitutional,
the other statutory. Regardless of whether the court analyzes the error as
constitutional or statutory, defendants usually are unable to meet this bur-
den absent a clear statement by the sentencing judge that she would have
imposed a different sentence if the Guidelines were advisory, not manda-
107. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005).
108. United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 528 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Crosby, 397 F.3d at 118).
109. See United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Mares,
402 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 551-52 (8th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 733 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398
F.3d 1291, 1299 (11 th Cir. 2005).
110. See United States v. Epstein, 426 F.3d 431, 443 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 417
F.3d 483, 489 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Norman, 427 F.3d 537, 539 (8th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Jones, 425 F.3d 1274, 1276 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. York, 428 F.3d 1325, 1336 (1 1th
Cir. 2005).
111. The Fifth Circuit explained that "the error is the imposition of a sentence, which was enhanced
by using judge found facts, not admitted by the defendant or found by the jury, in a mandatory Guide-
lines system." Mares, 402 F.3d at 521.
112. See supra note 3.
113. According to the Eleventh Circuit, the constitutional error is only that the sentencing judge
used extra-verdict enhancements in a mandatory system, not that she used extra-verdict enhancements
at all. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300.
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tory. 114 Accordingly, for defendants in these circuits who were sentenced
under the pre-Booker Guidelines, the Court's determination that the manda-
tory Guidelines violated defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
makes absolutely no difference unless the sentencing judge made a state-
ment, on the record, indicating a desire to deviate from the Guidelines.
Prior to Booker, however, "well-established case law substantially under-
mined any need or incentive for sentencing courts... to note their objec-
tions and reservations in sentencing defendants under the then-mandatory
guidelines." 1
5
Recognizing this problem, the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Cir-
cuits have determined that the appellate court cannot properly apply plain
error doctrine unless the case is first remanded to the district court to dis-
cover whether the judge would impose a lesser sentence under advisory,
rather than mandatory Guidelines. 116 These circuits comprise the Category
Two. Essentially, the Category Two procedure is precisely the same form
of conventional plain error analysis used by the circuits in Category One."17
The important difference is that these circuits, unlike those in the Category
One, will not withhold Sixth Amendment rights from those defendants
whose sentencing judges failed to mention a desire to impose a lesser sen-
tence. Furthermore, the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. circuits, like the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, recognize two separate types of Booker error:
constitutional error if the sentencing judge used extra-verdict enhance-
ments, and non-constitutional (referred to as procedural or statutory) error
if the sentencing judge presumed the Guidelines to be mandatory rather
than advisory." 8 Either type of error will require the limited remand ap-
proach adopted by these circuits.1 19
114. See United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 528 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Gonzalez-Huerta,
403 F.3d at 752-53 (Briscoe, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Barnett, 398 F.3d at 529.
116. See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino, 401
F.3d 471, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
117. "[P]lain error analysis as it relates to Booker errors depends on whether the district judge
would have imposed the same sentence had he known that the guidelines were merely advisory."
United States v. Caldwell, 423 F.3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2005). See also United States v. Moreno-
Hernandez, 419 F.3d 906, 915 (9th Cir. 2005).
118. See Crosby, 397 F.3d at 114; United States v. Schlifer, 403 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2005);
Ameline, 409 F.3d at 1084.
119. The Second Circuit differs from the others in that it does not retain jurisdiction over the case,
but requires the sentencing court "itself[to] vacate the original sentence if it determines that resentenc-
ing is warranted." Coles, 403 F.3d at 770 (citing Crosby, 397 F.3d at 117, 120) (emphasis in original).
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The Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, comprising Category Three,
also recognize two separate types of Booker error. 120 These circuits, how-
ever, recognizing that the defendant will rarely be able to prove that the
outcome would have been different under advisory Guidelines, have
adopted the presumption of prejudice approach to plain error review that
the Court raised in Olano.121 The Third and Sixth Circuits presume preju-
dice regardless of whether the Booker error is constitutional or non-
constitutional, whereas the Fourth Circuit will presume prejudice only
where the sentencing judge committed constitutional error.122 Accordingly,
in cases where the sentencing judge committed constitutional error and
where it is not clear "whether the District Court would have imposed a
greater or lesser sentence under an advisory framework," the Third, Fourth,
and Sixth Circuits will automatically remand all cases where the "appellant
raises a Booker claim and establishes plain error. '123
While important distinctions exist among each of the twelve ap-
proaches, 124 this Comment will discuss the approaches more generally,
focusing on one representative case from each of these three broad catego-
ries and using cases from the other circuits to further illustrate that repre-
sentative. These categories are ideally represented by opinions from the
Eleventh, 125 the Seventh, 126 and the Sixth Circuits. 127 Of the three, the
Sixth Circuit's presumption of prejudice approach to the substantial rights
prong of plain error review best satisfies the opposing demands of judicial
efficiency and due process implicated by the Court's decision in Booker.
120. See United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 553 (4th Cir. 2005); Barnett, 398 F.3d at 527.
121. SeeDavis, 407 F.3d at 165; Hughes, 401 F.3d at 548; Barnett, 398 F.3d at 527-28.
122. Where the defendant asserts that the error committed was non-constitutional, the Fourth
Circuit, like those circuits in Category One, shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate prejudice.
United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 216-23 (4th Cir. 2005).
123. Davis, 407 F.3d at 165-66. See also United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 535 (4th Cir.
2005).
124. See supra notes 9, 111, 113, 119, 122; see also infra, note 133.
125. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11 th Cir. 2005).
126. See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005).
127. See United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2005).
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A. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed opinions from the Fourth, 128 Sixth, 129
and Second 130 Circuits prior to issuing its decision in United States v. Rod-
riguez.131 In its analysis, the Rodriguez court initially declared that "plain
error review should be exercised 'sparingly."'' 132 In line with the other cir-
cuits, the court determined that the first two prongs of the plain error test
are met by any case involving Booker error.133 Contrary to its sister cir-
cuits, however, the Eleventh Circuit has determined for purposes of plain
error review that the constitutional error1 34 in Booker is not the Sixth
Amendment violation but rather "that there [are] extra-verdict enhance-
ments used in a mandatory guidelines system. ' 135 Believing the sentencing
judge erred only by using the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion, the court
next inquired "whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result
if the guidelines had been applied in an advisory instead of binding fashion
by the sentencing judge."'1 36 This inquiry is flawed because it is based on a
fundamentally incorrect interpretation of the Court's decision in Booker.
Although the Second Circuit similarly recognizes only one constitu-
tional Booker error, its approach differs from the Eleventh Circuit in that
the Second Circuit combines the Sixth Amendment violation of extra-
128. United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2005). Subsequent to filing the original
opinion discussed by the Rodriguez court, the Fourth Circuit voted to grant panel rehearing and issued
an amended opinion on March 16, 2005. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 544 n.2 (4th Cir.
2005).
129. See United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2005).
130. See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir 2005).
131. 398 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005).
132. Id. at 1298 (citing Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999)).
133. A thorough examination of the federal appellate courts' application of plain error doctrine is
beyond the scope of this Comment. All twelve circuits that have reviewed Booker appeals have deter-
mined that the first two prongs are met by constitutional error, non-constitutional error, or both. All
circuits except the Tenth presume the fourth prong will be met when the third is satisfied. See United
States v. Clifton, 406 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 2005). This Comment therefore will focus only on the
third prong of plain error review, the substantial rights prong.
134. In the initial Rodriguez decision, the Eleventh Circuit recognized only one Booker error.
Subsequently, however, the court recognized a second form of Booker error. Despite its later recogni-
tion that Booker caused two separate errors, the Eleventh Circuit fails to recognize that its definition of
the constitutional Booker error is incorrect. "Because the effect of Booker error is the same regardless of
the type, our decisions make no functional distinction between constitutional and statutory error. For
purposes of the plain error rule, unpreserved error is unpreserved error." United States v. Rodriguez,
406 F.3d 1261, 1262 (11th Cir. 2005).
135. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005). The Rodriguez court sup-
ports this contention with two reasons: (1) part one of Booker states that the Guidelines' use would not
implicate the Sixth Amendment if they were advisory rather than mandatory; and (2) part two of Booker
"specifically provides for extra-verdict enhancements in all future sentencings." Id.
136. Id. at 1301.
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verdict enhancements with the mandatory aspect. 137 The Eleventh Circuit,
by contrast, rests its analysis on the erroneous contention that extra-verdict
enhancements are not to be considered as part of the constitutional error. 138
This approach leads the court to an extremely simplistic view of substantial
rights analysis, in which it determines that "the prejudicial impact of the
error... must be gauged in terms of the part of the procedure that is to be
changed."' 139 Accordingly, defendants must show "a reasonable probabil-
ity" that the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence if it had
viewed the Guidelines as being advisory rather than mandatory. 140 If the
answer is unclear, which it almost always will be, the defendant has not
met his burden of showing that his substantial rights have been affected,
and remand is denied. 141 This test is incorrect both because it relies on a
faulty interpretation of Jones v. United States142 and because it disregards
the importance of procedural safeguards, recognized not only by the
Court's dual holding in Booker,143 but also in Olano 144 and Dominguez
Benitez. 1
4 5
The Rodriguez court relies on Jones to support the proposition that
where "the effect of the error is uncertain so that we do not know which, if
either, side it helped the defendant loses."'1 46 This is incorrect because it
directly contradicts the Court's holding in Kotteakos v. United States: in
cases where the reviewing judge is not certain the judgment was unaffected
137. In Crosby, the court stated,
[A] sentencing judge would violate the Sixth Amendment by making factual findings and
mandatorily enhancing a sentence above the range applicable to facts found by a jury or ad-
mitted by a defendant.... Second, and less obviously, a sentencing judge would commit pro-
cedural error by mandatorily applying the applicable Guidelines range that was based solely
on facts found by a jury or admitted by a defendant.
United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 114 (2d Cir. 2005).
138. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1301.
139. Id. at 1302.
140. Id. at 1301.
141. Id.
142. 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
143. In Booker, the Court stated, "As a matter of simple justice, it seemed obvious that the proce-
dural safeguards designed to protect Apprendi from punishment for the possession of a firearm should
apply equally to his violation of the hate crime statute." United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 748
(2005). Although this discussion did not arise in the context of plain error review, it is clear that the
Court views procedural safeguards as a fundamental part of our criminal justice system.
144. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 745 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing
importance of procedural safeguards).
145. Deciding that the burden of establishing prejudice for the purpose of plain error review
"should not be too easy for defendants in Dominguez's position," the Court carefully noted that this was
so, in part, because the violation claimed was not of due process. United States v. Dominguez Benitez,
542 U.S. 74, 82-83 (2004).
146. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300.
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by the error, there was an effect on the defendant's substantial rights. 147
The Court affirmed this holding in O'Neal v. McAninch, explaining that
"[w]hen a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about
whether a trial error of federal law had 'substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict,' that error is not harmless. And,
the petitioner must win."'148 Although O'Neal arises in the context of a
habeas petition, the Court's decision is based on Kotteakos.149 As such, it
applies not only to the standard federal appellate courts should use in harm-
less error review, but also in the standard to be used in plain error review,
because, as the Court stated in Olano, the inquiry regarding prejudice is the
same under both.150
The Rodriguez court also errs by disregarding the importance of pro-
cedural safeguards to our criminal justice system. The Court's two-part
Booker opinion clearly held that sentencing courts erred not only by apply-
ing the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion, but also by using extra-verdict
enhancements that deprive a defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial. The Eleventh Circuit disregards this latter part of the holding
reasoning that "[e]xtra-verdict enhancements are to be determined and used
in the post-Booker world."'151 This simplistic justification fails, however,
because it does not fully consider the import of the third prong of the plain
error test. 152 As observed by the Fourth Circuit, "[c]onsidering the Booker
147. 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946). See also Edwards, supra note 20, at 1175.
148. 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995).
149. Id. at 439; see also Edwards, supra note 20, at 1203.
150. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).
151. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1301.
152. Indirectly addressing the position taken by the Eleventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit points out
an important distinction overlooked by the Rodriguez court-there is a
difference between the guilt phase of a case and the punishment phase. Guilt is either-or; the
defendant is either guilty or innocent. If an error is committed and the defendant is convicted,
the appellate court has only to consider whether the defendant would probably have been ac-
quitted had the error not occurred. If so-if the error may well have precipitated a miscarriage
of justice (which the conviction of an innocent person is)-it is a plain error and the defen-
dant is entitled to a new trial. But sentencing is not either-or; it is the choice of a point within
a range established by Congress, and normally the range is a broad one.
United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 482 (7th Cir 2005). Accordingly, "it is impossible for a re-
viewing court to determine-without consulting the sentencing judge. . -whether the judge would
have [given the same sentence even if the Guidelines were merely advisory]." Id. In contrast to the
Eleventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit does not end the inquiry there, but instead continues with its
analysis:
[I]f... the sentencing judge might well have decided to impose a lighter sentence than dic-
tated by the guidelines had he not thought himself bound by them, his error in having thought
himself bound may have precipitated a miscarriage of justice. It is a miscarriage of justice to
give a person an illegal sentence that increases his punishment, just as it is to convict an inno-
cent person.... To tell a defendant we know your sentence would have been 60 months
shorter had the district judge known the guidelines were merely advisory, because he's told us
it would have been-but that is your tough luck and you'll just have to stew in prison for 60
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remedy in determining whether a defendant has established an effect on
substantial rights from a pre-Booker Sixth Amendment violation would
essentially require [the reviewing court] to disregard the Sixth Amendment
error altogether." 53
Even though, as the Rodriguez court emphasized,154 the Court recog-
nized that there would be no Sixth Amendment violation if the original
Guidelines had been written as advisory, they were not advisory. Prior to
the Court's decision in Booker, the Guidelines were "mandatory and bind-
ing on all judges,"'155 thereby depriving the sentencing judge of discretion.
Accordingly, the sentencing judge who used extra-verdict enhancements
prior to the Court's decision in Booker erred not only by using the Guide-
lines in a mandatory fashion, but also by depriving the defendant of his
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.
The Eleventh Circuit's approach is incorrect because it focuses only
on the second part of the Court's Booker opinion, completely disregarding
the Sixth Amendment error committed by judicial use of extra-verdict en-
hancements. 156 Although it is true that sentencing judges will be able to
consider extra-verdict enhancements post-Booker, that consideration will
be tempered by other relevant factors, including mitigating evidence of-
fered by defendants. Moreover, part one of the Court's decision in Booker
placed enormous emphasis on the importance of the traditional guarantee
of a jury trial to protect the "fairness and reliability" of our criminal justice
system. 157 While it is undeniably true that a logical disconnect exists be-
tween Booker's two parts, 158 that disconnect does not negate Booker's
holding that extra-verdict sentencing under mandatory guidelines violated a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. The Eleventh Circuit's focus on the
mandatory aspect and corresponding disregard for the Sixth Amendment
error thus undermines the fairness, integrity, and public repute of the fed-
eral judiciary process regardless of whether the defendant is able to demon-
strate prejudice.
additional months because of an acknowledged violation of the Constitution-would under-
mine the fairness, the integrity, and the public repute of the federal judicial process.
Id. at 483 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
153. United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 551 (4th Cir. 2005).
154. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300.
155. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 750 (2005).
156. According to the Eleventh Circuit, the constitutional error is only that the sentencing judge
used extra-verdict enhancements in a mandatory system, not that she used extra-verdict enhancements
at all. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300.
157. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
158. "The source of the logical disconnect between the two opinions was deep within the jurispru-
dence itself." Reitz, supra note 61, at 1096.
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Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Rodriguez, the error in
Booker appeals is not only that extra-verdict enhancements were used in a
mandatory guidelines system, but also that the Sixth Amendment rights of
these defendants have been violated. The Rodriguez court's decision to
deny remand to all such defendants across the board 59 because they cannot
meet an impossible testl 60 is contrary to the requirements of procedural due
process and, indeed, simple justice. The Eleventh Circuit's approach to the
third prong of plain error review thus is not appropriate for review of
Booker appeals, and is symptomatic of the adverse effect of the Supreme
Court's failure to provide proper guidance to the lower courts.
In both its plain error jurisprudence and the line of cases culminating
in Booker, the Court is striving to achieve a balance between the demands
of crime control and judicial efficiency on the one hand, and a defendant's
right to procedural due process on the other. The Eleventh Circuit's ap-
proach to the substantial rights prong certainly facilitates the former, but it
fails to consider the defendant's constitutional rights to a jury trial. Failure
to consider this violation of constitutional rights deprives the defendant of
his right to procedural due process, and therefore does not comport with the
Supreme Court's decision in Booker.
B. Seventh Circuit
The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit, while not as overtly
flawed as that of the Eleventh Circuit, also is not appropriate for direct
review of Booker error. Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit had
the benefit of reading the opinions of several other circuits prior to deciding
its first Booker error cases. 161 The Seventh Circuit follows a similar path to
159. The Eleventh Circuit does leave open the possibility that a defendant may receive a remand,
but only if there is some clear indication that the sentencing judge acted as she did only because the
Guidelines were mandatory. Such a clear indication is exceedingly unlikely, however, and the result of
the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit is to automatically deny remand to most, if not all, defen-
dants. See United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1333-34 (1 th Cir. 2005).
160. According to an Eighth Circuit judge,
[I]t is impractical, if not impossible, to gauge the prejudice actually suffered by a defendant
sentenced under a mandatory as opposed to an advisory guideline regime. The duty of show-
ing prejudice which the majority seeks to bestow on a defendant is like asking a defendant to
prove the existence of a divine-being or the existence of life on a planet other than our own.
The evidence either does not exist or is beyond the defendant's mere human capabilities, thus
any attempt to explain how a defendant may meet this showing, without an explicit statement
on the record by the sentencing judge, is nothing more than an empty exercise in casuistry.
United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 564 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bye, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
161. The Seventh Circuit's opinion cites opinions of post-Booker decisions from the Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483-84 (7th Cir.
2005).
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that taken by the Eleventh Circuit in that the court concludes it is impossi-
ble for a reviewing court to determine whether the defendant suffered
prejudice because there is no way to know whether the sentencing judge
would have issued the same sentence under advisory Guidelines. 162 The
Seventh Circuit disagrees with the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit,
however, because the Eleventh Circuit's approach serves to "condemn
some unknown fraction of criminal defendants to serve an illegal sen-
tence." 163 Yet the Seventh Circuit also disagrees with the approach taken
by the Fourth 64 and Sixth 165 Circuits because, according to the Paladino
court, "[t]he equal and opposite error is to assume that every sentence im-
posed in violation of the Sixth Amendment and therefore of Booker is
plainly erroneous and thus automatically entitles the defendant to be resen-
tenced."16
6
The Seventh Circuit recognizes the distinction between a constitu-
tional error and a non-constitutional error. 167 The court's analysis is the
same, however, under either form of Booker error. Noting that there would
be no prejudice to the defendant if the judge would impose the same sen-
tence regardless of whether the Guidelines are advisory or mandatory, 168
the Seventh Circuit follows the Second Circuit's lead. This approach to the
substantial rights prong of plain error analysis for Booker error is thus to
remand the case to the District Court, 169 asking the sentencing judge if she
would have given a different sentence under the Guidelines if the Guide-
lines were advisory rather than mandatory. 170 If the judge answers no, the
court will affirm the original sentence as long as it is reasonable; 171 if the
162. Id. at 482.
163. Id. at 484.
164. Id. at 483 (citing United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374, 380-81 (4th Cir. 2005)).
165. Id. (citing United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir. 2005)).
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., United States v. White, 406 F.3d 827, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2005).
168. Paladino, 401 F.3d at 483.
169. Although otherwise modeled after the approach taken by the Second Circuit in United States
v. Crosby, the approach devised by the Seventh Circuit differs because the Seventh Circuit, unlike the
Second, retains jurisdiction over the case throughout the limited remand. The court will vacate the
sentence upon notification that the judge would have imposed a different sentence under advisory
Guidelines, then remand to the district court for resentencing. Id. at 484.
170. Id. at 483-84.
171. The Supreme Court not only excised the provision of the Guidelines that made the Guidelines
mandatory; the Court also excised the provision that set forth standards of review. The Court decided
that a standard of reasonableness was appropriate in this case both because such a standard is "consis-
tent with appellate sentencing practice during the last two decades," and, prior to 2003, the excised
provision that set forth the standards of review "explicitly set forth" review for reasonableness. United
States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 765-66 (2005).
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judge answers yes, the court "will vacate the original sentencing and re-
mand for resentencing."' 172
Although the Seventh Circuit's approach is preferable to that of the
Eleventh Circuit, this application of the substantial rights prong also fails to
comport with the Supreme Court's opinion in Booker. The Seventh Cir-
cuit's application properly considers the defendant's constitutional rights
and, to at least some extent, the importance of procedural safeguards; but it
nonetheless fails because it improperly delegates responsibility to evaluate
plain error to the district court. 173 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit's ap-
proach does not provide an opportunity for the defendant to present addi-
tional mitigating evidence to the sentencing judge if, upon the limited
remand, the sentencing judge declares that she would have given the same
sentence under advisory Guidelines. In such a situation the defendant will
not receive a new sentencing hearing because the Seventh Circuit will af-
firm the sentence as long as it is reasonable. 174 Thus, it is possible that even
under the Seventh Circuit's approach of limited remand, the Booker error
may cause a miscarriage of justice due to the fact that Booker altered the
entire legal framework under which the defendant was originally sen-
tenced. As demonstrated below, such an error can be corrected only by
presuming prejudice.
C. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit, like the Eleventh Circuit, begins its inquiry into the
proper substantial rights application by looking to United States v.
Olano.175 Unlike the Rodriguez court, however, the Sixth Circuit takes note
of Olano's two exceptions1 76 to the general rule that the defendant must
"demonstrate that the error 'affected the outcome of the district court pro-
ceedings."'' 177 The Court has found structural error only in cases in which a
defendant has been "denied certain fundamental rights," such as the follow-
172. Paladino, 401 F.3d at 484.
173. "The Crosby solution [the solution adopted by the Seventh Circuit] turns the review process
on its head. The determination of plain error is the duty of courts of appeal, not district courts." United
States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1305 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Dominguez Benitez,
542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)). See also Paladino, 401 F.3d at 487 (Ripple, J., dissenting) ("The panel deci-
sion today offers a superficially pragmatic, but not a principled, basis for adopting its novel approach to
plain error analysis. Particularly troubling, in terms of its long-term impact, is the delegation to the
district court of our judicial responsibility to evaluate plain error on an independent basis.") (emphasis
in original).
174. Paladino, 401 F.3d at 484.
175. United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005).
176. These exceptions are structural errors and errors that are presumed to be prejudicial. See
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993).
177. Barnett, 398 F.3d at 526.
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ing: the right to counsel; the right to an impartial judge; exclusion of jurors
of defendant's race from grand jury; the right to a public trial; and errone-
ous reasonable doubt jury instructions. 178 Booker does not implicate any of
these enumerated rights, so the Barnett court determined that this exception
did not apply. 179 According to Olano, the other exception, a presumption of
prejudice, is appropriate in situations where the defendant cannot make a
specific showing. 180 Courts have presumed prejudice in numerous situa-
tions where "the inherent nature of the error made it exceptionally difficult
for the defendant to demonstrate that the outcome.., would have been
different" but for the error. 181 Because this is precisely the situation in
cases of Booker error, the Sixth Circuit held that a presumption of prejudice
should apply in cases of pre-Booker sentencing.1
82
The Sixth Circuit recognizes two distinct forms of Booker error: error
exists where the sentencing judge used extra-verdict enhancements, which
according to Booker violates the Sixth Amendment; 183 and error also exists
where, as in Barnett, the plain error is not a Sixth Amendment violation,
184
but rather that the sentencing court treated the Guidelines as mandatory
rather than advisory. 185 Recognizing that either form of error creates the
same difficulty for the defendant, the Sixth Circuit crafted its holding to
apply to both forms; the court also explicitly specified that the presumption
of prejudice is rebuttable.186
This rebuttable presumption is a crucial part of the Barnett court's
holding because if the presumption were not rebuttable, the Sixth Circuit's
application of the substantial rights prong would not conform to Booker's
caution that not all cases should be remanded for resentencing. 187 The re-
178. For a list of these cases, see supra note 86.
179. See Barnett, 398 F.3d at 526. After briefly discussing the exception made for structural errors,
the Barnett court noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has found 'structural errors only in a very limited
class of cases."' Id. The court proceeded to analyze and adopt the second exception of presumed preju-
dice. Id. at 526-29.
180. Id. at 526 (citing Manning v. Huffinan, 269 F.3d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 2001)).
181. Id. at 526-27. The Barnett court cited cases from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits in which the court found it appropriate to presume prejudice when evaluating the substantial
rights prong of plain error review. In each case, prejudice was presumed both because of the nature of
the error and the difficulty the defendant would have in showing that the error was prejudicial. Id.
182. Id. at 527-28.
183. See United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 378 (6th Cir. 2005).
184. Barnett claimed that his Sixth Amendment rights as defined by Apprendi were violated by the
district court's application of the Armed Career Criminal Act, but the court of appeals ruled that there
was no Sixth Amendment violation because "Apprendi does not require the nature or character of prior
convictions to be determined by ajury." Barnett, 398 F.3d at 524.
185. Id. at 527.
186. Id. at 529.
187. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 769 (2005).
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buttable presumption allows the Sixth Circuit to successfully balance the
competing demands for judicial efficiency with a defendant's constitutional
rights, because if the prosecution is able to demonstrate that the defendant
was not prejudiced, there is no violation of the defendant's right to due
process.
A presumption of prejudice is necessary in the application of substan-
tial rights analysis for plain error review of either type of Booker error for
two reasons: first, because of the difficulty (if not impossibility) of showing
that the outcome would have been different but for the error; and second,
because "[u]nder the new post-Booker framework, counsel are now able to
present aggravating and mitigating circumstances 'that existed at the time
[of pre-Booker sentencing] but were not available for consideration under
the mandatory Guidelines regime."'' 188
As both the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits recognize, there is no way
to know what sentence the sentencing judge would have imposed if she had
known that the Guidelines were advisory rather than mandatory. Following
its peculiar interpretation of the Supreme Court's plain error jurisprudence,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded, "[I]f the effect of the error is uncertain so
that we do not know which, if either, side it helped the defendant loses." 189
The Seventh Circuit rejected this position and concluded that in such a
situation, it is necessary to issue a limited remand in order to inquire of the
sentencing judge whether she would have imposed a lesser sentence under
advisory Guidelines. Yet neither approach considers the important fact that
the defendant convicted and sentenced prior to Booker was effectively de-
nied the opportunity to present mitigating evidence to the sentencing judge
because such evidence was irrelevant under the then-mandatory Guidelines.
In sum, because the entire legal framework in which [the defendant's]
sentencing occurred was flawed, there is no way for him to prove, and
for [the court of appeals] to accurately assess, the likelihood that the dis-
trict court would have imposed a different sentence had it known it had
the discretion to do so. In other words, "it would be exceedingly difficult
for the [defendant] to show that his sentence would have been different if
the district court had sentenced him under [an] advisory, rather than the
mandatory, Guidelines framework." 190
These considerations make it clear that direct review of Booker error
requires federal appellate courts to utilize the presumed prejudice exception
to the substantial rights prong provided by the Supreme Court in Olano. In
188. Barnett, 398 F.3d at 528 (citing United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 118 (2d Cir. 2005)).
189. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1300(llth Cir. 2005).
190. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 752 (10th Cir. 2005) (Briscoe, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Barnett, 398 F.3d at 528).
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Olano, the Court declared that there was no need to decide when prejudice
should be presumed. In the wake of Booker, that need has arrived.
CONCLUSION
To resolve the current intercircuit split regarding the proper applica-
tion of the substantial rights prong of plain error review, the Supreme Court
should adopt the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Barnett
and United States v. Oliver. A presumption of prejudice is appropriate for
review of both constitutional and non-constitutional Booker error not only
because of the impossibility of proving adverse effect, but also because any
other approach will undermine the credibility of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Regardless of whether the perceived error is classified as constitu-
tional or non-constitutional, a defendant sentenced under the pre-Booker
Guidelines would not have had any reason to present evidence that might
have influenced the sentencing judge to impose a different sentence from
that mandated by the Guidelines.
An automatic denial of remand, which is the result of the approach
taken by the First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, will harm
the system as a whole. Defendants convicted under the mandatory Guide-
lines and awaiting appeal will not understand the technicalities of the rule;
they will legitimately feel that they have been denied due process and the
American guarantee of justice for all. Conversely, automatic partial re-
mand, the result of the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits' ap-
proach, is an unwieldy solution that is contrary to the Court's opinion in
Booker. The approach taken by the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, with a
presumption of prejudice, is the only approach to properly consider both
the Court's opinion in Booker and the Court's prior plain error jurispru-
dence. Of these circuits, however, the Sixth Circuit's approach is the only
one that properly considers both the Supreme Court's directive that not all
cases involving Booker errors should be remanded and the important con-
cern for procedural due process that is necessary for the continued credibil-
ity of our judicial system. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should adopt
the reasoning exemplified by the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Barnett and
take the next opportunity to clarify that a rebuttable presumption of preju-
dice is appropriate in plain error review of Booker error.
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